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Abstract
This paper calibrates the dynamic illegal migration model studied by Hazari and Sgro (2003)
to eight countries. We find that if illegal migrants and domestic labor are perfect substitutes
in production, the presence of illegal migrants lowers domestic welfare between 0.09% and
2.93% among eight countries. Moreover, we show that there is a tradeoff between the
long-run domestic wage rate and rental rate of capital from receiving illegal migrants.
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1   Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been increasing interest in the welfare effect of illegal 
migration in a dynamic context. This is reflected in the recent writings of Hazari and Sgro 
(2003) and Moy and Yip (2006). Hazari and Sgro (2003) develop a Ramsey-type 
dynamic optimizing model to show that illegal migration necessarily lowers the long-run 
per capita domestic consumption given that illegal migrants and domestic residents are 
perfect substitutes in production. Moy and Yip (2006) reexamine the Hazari-Sgro model 
and find that the welfare effect of illegal migration is ambiguous but the effect is positive 
in the case of Cobb-Douglas production technology.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to quantitatively evaluate the welfare effect of the 
illegal migration model studied by Hazari and Sgro (2003) and to investigate the extent to 
which different countries are affected by illegal migration in an international context. 
Contrary to the analytical result in Hazari and Sgro (2003) that illegal migration 
necessarily lowers the long-run per capita domestic consumption, we numerically show 
that illegal migration shifts up the time path of per capita domestic consumption, and 
hence the domestic welfare (aggregate utility) increases between 0.09% and 2.93% 
among eight countries. From the perspective of the domestic welfare, the U.S. benefits 
the most and Japan the least from illegal migration. A higher proportion of illegal 
migrants of total labor force and a higher intensity of wage exploitation on illegal 
migrants are two major underlying factors that an economy benefits more from illegal 
migration. In addition, we find that there is a long-run negative relationship between the 
change in domestic wage rate and the change in rental rate of capital. Therefore, despite 
an increase in the aggregate welfare of domestic residents, illegal migration could bring 
about an income distribution problem between the capitalists and domestic workers. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
Hazari-Sgro Model. Section 3 calibrates the model and discusses the results. Section 4 
concludes with a brief summary. 
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2      Review of the Hazari-Sgro Model 
 
The economy produces output, Y, with the help of capital, K, domestic labor, L, and 
illegal migrants, M. The production function exhibits (1) constant returns to scale, (2) 
diminishing returns to factors, and satisfies (3) the Inada conditions. Given that L and M 
are perfect substitutes, the production function is given below: 
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where y is per capita output and  k   is per capita capital. 
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where r denotes rental rate of capital, w wage rate of domestic labor, wm wage rate of 
illegal migrants, β intensity of wage exploitation on illegal migrants. The term  01 β <<  
means that illegal migrants are paid below domestic labor for the same marginal 
productivity. Domestic consumption can be defined as: 
 
  CYK w M β =−−    (3) 
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where  C is domestic consumption,  K   investment in capital, βwM wage payment to 
illegal migrants. It is assumed that illegal migrants do not accumulate capital in the host 
country and grow at the same rate as domestic labor, n. If we write equation (3) in an 
intensive form and define  /( ) mMLM =+ ,  / cC L = ,  /( ) kKLM = + , we can derive 
the economy-wide resource constraint as: 
 
  () ( 1 ) kf kn k m c w m β =− − − −    (4) 
 
In order to calibrate the model in later section, we reformulate the dynamic 
optimization problem with CRRA utility function and Cobb-Douglas production function, 
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By applying the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, this dynamic optimization problem 
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Solving this dynamic optimization problem and doing some manipulations, we obtain 
two ordinary differential equations: 
 
  (1 ) (1 ) kk n k m c m k
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and the following transversality condition: 
 
  [ ] lim ( ) ( ) 0
t tkt λ
→∞ =   (7) 
 




The Hazari-Sgro model is calibrated to eight countries, i.e. the U.S., Canada, 
Germany, France, Spain, Japan, Sweden, and the U.K., respectively. The parameter 
values of eight countries are given in Table 1 and the data sources are described in Data 
Appendix.  φ   is capital share, n is population growth rate,  /( ) mMLM =+  is 
proportion of illegal migrants of total labor force, and β is intensity of wage exploitation 
on illegal migrants (or ratio of average wage of illegal migrants to that of domestic labor). 
Since there are no available data on the wage rate of illegal migrants, so we use the 
minimum wage rate adopted by each country as a proxy for the average wage rate of 
illegal migrants in that particular country. This choice is reasonable in that illegal 
migrants are exploited by domestic employers so that their average wage rate is closely 
related to the minimum wage rate in the host country. Suppose the government raises the 
minimum wage rate, then the domestic employers have more incentives to hire illegal 
migrants to save labor cost, so an increase in labor demand for illegal migrants drives up 
the average wage rate of illegal migrants. ρ is consumer’s subjective discount rate and θ 
is elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption. Following the economic growth 
literature, we calibrate ρ to 0.02 and θ to 2.   
 
3.2 Domestic Welfare 
 
In order to accurately measure the impact of illegal migration on the domestic 
welfare, we do not only look at per capita domestic consumption in the steady state but 
also in the transitional dynamics. So, we numerically solve out the time path of per capita   5
domestic consumption. Figure 1 shows the case of the U.S. with the time path of per 
capita domestic consumption shifts up in the presence of illegal migration. This means 
that illegal migration increases per capita domestic consumption in both the transitional 
dynamics and the steady state. Therefore, our numerical result is in contrast to the 
analytical result of Hazari and Sgro (2003) because they argue that illegal migration 
necessarily lowers the long-run per capita domestic consumption for all production 
functions. Also, our numerical result support the analytical finding of Moy and Yip (2006) 
that the long-run effect on per capita domestic consumption is positive in the case of 
Cobb-Douglas production function. 
 
Since we have already found out the time path of per capita domestic consumption, 
we easily obtain the domestic aggregate utility by numerically integrating the discounted 
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It is shown in Table 2 that illegal migration raises the domestic welfare between 0.09% 
and 2.93% among eight countries. For example, the U.S. has the largest percentage 
increase in the domestic welfare (2.93%), Japan the lowest (0.09%), and other European 
countries between 0.31% and 2.17%. The percentage increase in the domestic welfare of 
the U.S. is about 33 times of Japan’s. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. 
Given that illegal migrants do not save in domestic economy, an inflow of illegal 
migrants lowers the accumulation of per capita capital in domestic economy that 
generates a negative intertemporal effect. On the other hand, domestic economy employs 
cheap illegal workers and then reaps some profits, which generates a positive “wage 
exploitation” effect. After all, the increase in per capita domestic consumption implies 
that the positive “wage exploitation” effect strictly dominates the negative intertemporal 
effect in the case of Cobb-Douglas production technology. 
 
We proceed to analyze why different countries have different increases in domestic   6
welfare under illegal migration. As shown in Table 2 we observe that countries with a 
higher increase in domestic welfare, namely, the U.S. and Spain, have a higher value of m, 
which means that they have a higher proportion of illegal migrants of total labor force. In 
addition, both of them have a lower value of β, which means that the average wage rate 
of illegal migrants is substantially lower than that of domestic labor. Therefore, this 
implies that a larger population of low-paid illegal migrants generates a higher economic 
profit for domestic economy and thus a higher increase in domestic welfare. On the other 
hand, even though the average wage rate of illegal migrants relative to domestic labor in 
Japan is low (β = 0.33), her proportion of illegal migrants of total labor force is also very 
low (m = 0.003), so Japan cannot gain very much from “wage exploitation” on illegal 
migrants.  
 
3.3 Domestic Wage Rate and Rental Rate of Capital 
 
Table 2 shows that the U.S. has the largest decrease in steady-state domestic wage 
rate (-0.70%), followed by Spain (-0.39%), and Japan the least (-0.04%). The percentage 
decline in domestic wage rate of the U.S. is about 18 times of Japan’s. The decline in 
domestic wage rate can be explained by the reason that illegal migrants are perfect 
substitutes for domestic labor in production, so the presence of illegal migrants increases 
the labor supply in domestic economy that lowers the marginal productivity and thus the 
wage rate of domestic labor.   
 
On the other hand, Table 2 shows that illegal migration raises the long-run rental rate 
of capital and the multitude is between 0.003% and 0.011% among eight countries. In 
other words, there is a negative long-run relationship between the change in domestic 
wage rate and the change in rental rate of capital as depicted in Figure 2. From receiving 
illegal migrants, the economy has to face a tradeoff between a lower domestic wage rate 
and a higher rental rate of capital. Therefore, illegal migration raises the aggregate 
welfare but also could bring about an income distribution problem between the capitalists 
and domestic workers in the economy. This explains why there are illegal migrants in the 
economy and the capitalists are willing to employ illegal migrants but the labor unions   7
always fight against the employment of them. Since in a representative agent model the 
welfare between the capitalists and domestic workers cannot be separately measured, so a 
deeper understanding about the income distribution issue on the welfare of the capitalists 
and domestic workers can be further investigated in some heterogeneous agent models. In 
addition, the Hazari-Sgro model also generates a migration policy implication that there 
could be an optimal number of illegal migrants if the government does not only maximize 
the aggregate welfare but also considers the income distribution problem in the economy. 
 
4   Concluding  Remarks 
 
By calibrating the Hazari-Sgro Model we have found that illegal migration does not 
necessarily lower but instead raises the domestic welfare when illegal migrants are 
perfect substitutes for domestic labor and that the increase in domestic welfare gained by 
different countries varies considerably. According to our calibration results, the U.S. 
benefits the most and Japan the least. Last, our calibration results shed some light on the 
issue of income distribution between the capitalists and domestic workers as there is a 
long-run negative relationship between the change in domestic wage rate and the change 
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Figure 2: The relationship between the percentage change in steady-state domestic wage 
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Table 1: Parameter values for eight countries. 
Country  φ   β   m   n 
U.S.  0.333  0.36  0.058 0.0110 
Canada  0.400  0.43  0.013 0.0110 
Germany  0.340  0.58  0.013 0.0029 
France  0.299  0.62  0.012 0.0047 
Spain  0.310  0.32  0.039 0.0055 
Japan  0.362  0.33  0.003 0.0031 
Sweden  0.355  0.51  0.017 0.0038 




Table 2: The percentage changes in domestic welfare, steady-state domestic wage rate, 
and steady-state rental rate of capital for eight countries. 
 
Country  Change in domestic 
welfare (%) 
Change in steady-state 
domestic wage rate 
(%) 
Change in steady-state 
rental rate of capital 
(%) 
U.S.  2.93  -0.70  1.41 
Canada  0.31  -0.22  0.34 
Germany  0.31  -0.26  0.50 
France  0.40  -0.22  0.52 
Spain  2.17  -0.39  0.87 
Japan  0.09  -0.04  0.06 
Sweden  0.43  -0.31  0.56 
U.K.  0.56  -0.24  0.47 














Table 4: Parameter sources for eight countries   
Parameter  Description  Source 
n  Average of population growth rate between 1985 and 2004  World Development Indicators (2006) 
L  Average of domestic labor force between 1985 and 2004  World Development Indicators (2006) 
M  Current population of illegal migrants  Table 2 
m  / M LM +   Author’s calculations 
φ   Physical income share  Table 2 
β  Ratio of minimum wage rate to average wage rate  Neumark and Wascher (2003) 
Country  φ   M 
U.S.  King and Rebelo (1999)  http://pewhispanic.org/ 
Canada  Murchison et al. (2004)  http://are.berkeley.edu/APMP/pubs/agworkvisa/canada111503.html 
Germany  Ertz (1997)  http://www.fnstusa.org/ImmigrationGermany.pdf 
France  Conesa and Kehoe (2005)  http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050511-100133-3494r.htm 
Spain  Conesa and Kehoe (2005)  http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33064 
Japan  Hayashi and Prescott (2002)  http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2003/vol42-06.pdf 
Sweden  Linde (2004)  http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/271dgkju.asp 
U.K.  Kapetanios et al. (2007)  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1572533,00.html   11
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